The claim that Keynes makes a tacit assumption in Chapter 3 of The General Theory, that short-term expectations are fulfilled, is unwarranted and unnecessary. The seminal paper by Kregel (1976) and its subsequent development by Chick, among others, which has contributed to the general acceptance of this claim, is critically evaluated in depth. The present paper clears the ground for a recognition that Keynes instead adopted the assumption of judicious foresight, which would now be called short-term rational expectations. This recognition in turn should encourage a reappraisal of Keynes's thought, by mainstream economists and others.
Now if for a given value of N the expected proceeds are greater than the aggregate supply price, i.e. if D is greater than Z, there will be an incentive to entrepreneurs to increase employment beyond N and, if necessary, to raise costs by competing with one another for the factors of production, up to the value of N for which Z has become equal to D. Thus the volume of employment is given by the point of intersection between the aggregate demand function and the aggregate supply function; for it is at this point that the entrepreneurs' expectation of profits will be maximised. The value of D at the point of the aggregate demand function, where it is intersected by the aggregate supply function, will be called the effective demand. (GT, The question turns on the meaning of Keynes's description of adjustment to equilibrium and how this relates to expectation. There can be no doubt that Keynes is here concerned with expectation, expected proceeds and expected profits. The consensus holds that the process of adjustment must be a dynamic process of convergence over time, motivated by the disappointment of expectations, so that equilibrium is reached and defined by the fulfilment of expectations. In grappling with the fact that Keynes specifies aggregate demand in terms of the expectations of entrepreneurs, writers have postulated the need for two aggregate demand functions, one in terms of entrepreneurial expectations, the other in terms of expenditure. There is some tension within the literature over which of the two demand functions defines the point of effective demand. The absence of the expenditure function in Keynes's text is taken as evidence that Keynes conflates the two, which is only possible if entrepreneurial expectations are fulfilled: therefore, it seems, this must be his tacit assumption.
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Again a point to note at once is that the idea of convergence of expectations to equilibrium is associated with the 'Swedish' approach, which predated Keynes and was expounded by Ohlin in the November 1936 Marshall Lectures (subsequently published as Ohlin, 1937) , and which the main object of Keynes's 1937 lectures, titled 'Ex Post, Ex Ante', was to repudiate:
For other economists, I find, lay the whole emphasis, and find the whole explanation in the differences between effective demand and income; and they are so convinced that this is the right course that they do not notice that in my treatment this is not so. (CW XIV, p. 181) Unfortunately these lecture notes were not published until 1973, which is one reason why Kregel (1976) is of particular importance as the beginning of a discussion about effective demand that appeared to have concluded with Amadeo (1989) , until its recent re-emergence. Since Kregel (1976) 
The test of consistency with the text of The General Theory

Kregel (1976)
The original purpose of Kregel (1976) was to defend the use of steady-state models by the Cambridge post-Keynesian School, notably Joan Robinson, against the claim that such models are inconsistent with the methodology of Keynes. Kregel argues that the core of The General Theory is the principle of effective demand, which can be expressed with static tools, with the disappointment of expectations and consequent dynamics taking second place. His overall proposition is that Keynes's concept of equilibrium as contingent on a state of expectation is radically different from the Walrasian perfect foresight model so that unemployment equilibrium (so defined) is possible even when expectations are fulfilled. There can be no disagreement with these primary propositions.
Kregel's article is now cited less for its principal purpose than for its definition of three models, of static, stationary and shifting equilibrium (see Table 1 ). Keynes himself referred to a 'division between the theory of stationary equilibrium and the theory of shifting equilibrium-meaning by the latter the theory of a system in which changing views about the future are capable of influencing the present situation' (GT, p. 293). In the 'static' model, the state of expectation is given and expectations are always realised; the system moves instantly to the point of effective demand. This model reflects the proposition in Keynes's 1937 lecture notes quoted above and corresponds to the tacit assumption. The 'stationary' model allows for individual expectations to be disappointed without affecting the underlying given state of 'general' expectations. Disappointed entrepreneurs then revise their expectations until, by trial and error, they hit on the point of effective demand. Finally in the 'shifting' model, the state of 'general' expectation can change, both independently and as a result of individual disappointments. This model describes an economy 'chasing an ever changing equilibrium -it need not catch it' (Kregel, 1976, p. 217) . could not affect long-term expectations which by assumption were held constant, Keynes found to be unsatisfactory … (Kregel, 1976, p. 212) The confusion here (apart from the interchange of period and term once again) is with the possibility that realised results disappoint short-term expectations yet the state of Kregel gives the example of a producer of electrical power as follows:
Short-period expectation determines how many kilowatts he expects to produce and how much labour he wants to hire to produce them, given capacity. Long-period expectations determine how much capacity he should have at various future dates and determine overall investment decisions and M G Hayes plans. If in one quarter demand for electricity falls by 5%, is this likely to cause a revision of long-period expectations of required future capacity? (Kregel, 1976, p. 224) The answer is clearly negative, but it is the wrong question. The question should be, if on any given day, demand for electricity falls 5% below expectation, should our electrical entrepreneur reduce the next day's employment? The answer is, probably not: one day's shortfall is unlikely to affect the state of expectation relevant to employment, i.e. the state of short-term expectation.
Finally, in Kregel's stationary and shifting equilibrium models, employment is more likely than not to be in disequilibrium at any time. In these models, the principle of effective demand does not determine employment at any time (unless we make the tacit assumption) but only the equilibrium position towards which employment would tend if individual expectations were stable enough to converge. By contrast, Keynes claims to offer a theory of actual employment at any time (GT, pp. xxxiii, 4, (245) (246) (247) based on the equilibrium of supply and demand (GT, pp. xxii-xxiii, xxxiv-xxxv, 3, 27-30), such that 'today's employment can be correctly described as governed by today's expectations' (GT, p. 50). Yet he himself refers to this as a 'theory of shifting equilibrium' (GT, p. 293). Chick, both in her major text on The General Theory (1983) and a subsequent article (1992), offers perhaps the most sophisticated development of the received idea that the equilibrium level of employment in The General Theory is discovered, in principle, by the fulfilment of expectations. She argues that, for the purposes of exposition, Keynes must have made the tacit assumption (Chick, 1983, pp. 64-65, 71) and explicitly relates this to Kregel's static model (ibid., p. 67). She objects that
Keynes provides no theory of the process by which firms come to evaluate aggregate demand, the need for such a theory is obviated by Keynes's assumption … that firms' estimates are correct. There is also no detailed discussion of the dynamics of adjustment of those estimates when they prove to be incorrect. (ibid., p. 76)
As justification for stating that 'Keynes adopted, in the early chapters, the assumption that firms' forecasts of aggregate demand were broadly correct' she quotes in a footnote (ibid., p. 71, n. 15) the following sentence from Keynes:
[It] will often be safe to omit express reference to short-term expectation, in view of the fact that in practice the process of revision of short-term expectation is a gradual and continuous one, carried on largely in the light of realised results; so that expected and realised results run into and overlap one another in their influence. (GT, p. 50) However, Keynes goes on to say:
For, although output and employment are determined by the producer's short- The causation here runs from realised result to expectation, not the other way.
Expectations conform to realised results, not realised results to expectations. There is nothing here to require that expectations based on realised results will in fact be fulfilled; there is indeed a hint here of the notion of conventional expectation (GT, . It is true that there is no detailed discussion of the dynamics of expectations formation, but why is such a discussion necessary? It is not necessary if employment at any time is determined by effective demand, i.e. by the state of expectation itself.
Chick indeed recognises that, for Keynes, employment at any time is determined by the point of effective demand but, contrary to Kregel, distinguishes this from the equilibrium point corresponding to actual demand (Chick, 1983, pp. 77-78) .
She distinguishes determinacy from equilibrium and requires the tacit assumption only to the extent that we insist on reading GT Chapter 3 as an exercise in equilibrium analysis. In her words 'Effective demand is an unfortunate term, for it really refers to the output that will be supplied; in general there is no assurance that it will also be demanded' (ibid., p. 65). She therefore accepts the likelihood of unemployment disequilibrium, and indeed goes further:
Because underemployment equilibrium is an aggregate concept, it is impossible to believe that it would be met precisely: the probability of hitting the relevant point on aggregate demand exactly must be insignificantly different from zero. Some firms will always be surprised. Theorists more concerned with purity than with relevance, who cannot accept approximations, would therefore argue that some force for adjustment, however weak, must always be present, and since Keynes provides no dynamic learning process by which estimates of demand are adjusted when they are falsified, he fails as a theorist in their eyes. (Chick, 1983, p. 77) Chick views this imprecision with equanimity and in her later methodological works has extended this to make a virtue of necessary compromise and formal vagueness in This understanding of short-term expectation differs markedly from that of Kregel and Chick, who envisage firms estimating demand curves, whether at the industry or aggregate level (Kregel, 1976, p. 225; Chick, 1992, p. 150) . Indeed this point connects directly with another disputed question, the assumptions about market structure in The General Theory. 4 Here we need concentrate, for present purposes, only on the distinction made by Chick between 'perfect competition' and 'polypoly', her term for competition between many small firms under uncertainty.
Chick rejects the price-taking of the received notion of 'perfect competition' because in her view it imposes the assumption of perfect foresight; she insists that under uncertainty all firms, even small ones, inevitably set prices. She asks: 'How can firms take prices from markets which lie in the future? The short answer, of course, is that they cannot' (Chick, 1992, p. 153 ' (1987, p. 490) and Chick 'that, once the question of uncertainty is addressed, the General Theory is compatible with any or all market structures ' (1992, p. 150) . Partly this is due to a confusion in the literature over the meaning of Keynes's degree of competition, which I have addressed elsewhere (Hayes, 2008) . M G Hayes which is correct in the sense that it corresponds uniquely to any given level of employment.
Uniqueness
Kregel defines his 'general (long-period) expectations' to correspond to Keynes's 'long-period employment' (GT, p. 48) as the end-point of a process of convergence of individual expectations (Kregel, 1976, pp. 215, 223-224) . Thus 'the state of general expectations' represents a set of expectations, which may not in fact exist in the minds of any entrepreneur, but is nevertheless an equilibrium position towards which individual expectations will tend by a process of trial and error. Chick (1983, p. 78) contains a diagram ( Chick's diagram, the centre of attraction is provided by the equilibrium of actual demand with supply conditions. So it seems that, contra Keynes, expectation does not really determine output and employment, except in the individual daily disequilibrium which Kregel and Chick regard as the normal state of affairs: the 'state of general expectations' is itself determined by the expenditure decisions of consumers and investors. The most one can claim for entrepreneurial expectation as an independent causal force is that the expenditure decisions of investors are determined by the state of long-term expectation. It follows that the state of short-term expectation is of no fundamental consequence and indeed, it is argued, Keynes himself accepts this view because after GT Chapter 5 aggregate demand is defined in terms of expenditure rather than entrepreneurial expectations.
Yet there is a lacuna in this interpretation of Keynes's long-period employment as corresponding to an equilibrium state of general expectation reached M G Hayes by a process of trial and error. Any such process of discovery must take place over time. If the end-point is to be defined by the equilibrium between expenditure demand and the conditions of supply, the aggregate supply curve must not shift (Kregel, 1976, p. 215) . At the same time we are assuming that investment is taking place, creating new capital-goods and therefore continuously changing the conditions of supply.
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Thus a further indeterminacy is introduced: if by chance individual expectations converge quickly, the state of general expectation will take one set of values; if convergence is more prolonged, the state of general expectation will take another. In fact there is a multitude of possible equilibrium positions which are not independent of the time it takes to find them. Thus we find ourselves immediately, even in what
Kregel defines as the model of stationary equilibrium, with the problem which Kregel defines by the model of shifting equilibrium, in which the behavioural functions are constantly shifting and equilibrium need never be reached. We began with general expectation as something unknown to any individual and now it appears that there can be an indefinite number of states of general expectation, since each depends on how long it takes for individuals to discover it.
Stability
It could be argued that it is not important that the state of general expectation is unique, what matters for the coherence of the principle of effective demand is that individual expectations can be expected to converge upon the state of general expectation, whatever it may be at any given time. Yet even this claim cannot be taken for granted. Chick's diagram (Fig. 1 ) assumes as self-evident the existence of a well-behaved function mapping excess demand onto changes in expected prices, which Hicks (1939, p. 255) , Arrow & Hahn (1971) and Vercelli (1991) have shown not to be the case in general when several markets are involved. What appears obvious at the microeconomic level of a single market does not hold at the macroeconomic level.
In this area we can, for once, profit by taking a leaf out of the Walrasian literature (including its critics), much of which has been concerned with questions of stability and expectations formation. In Hicks's seminal analysis, the stability of the equilibrium depends on the elasticity of expectations and the simplest adaptive assumption, that expectations are revised in line with realised results (unit elasticity),
does not lead to convergence and easily topples over into instability. Arrow & Hahn (1971, pp. 263-369) show that stability theorems even for models of pure exchange depend on an assumption of continuity which is easily over-turned by the possibility of bankruptcy. Vercelli (1991, pp. 100-104) identifies 5 ad hoc assumptions necessary to avoid both dynamic and/or structural instability and indeterminacy.
Evans and Honkapohja (2001) present a theory of adaptive learning, in which agents are assumed to behave like econometricians, estimating the parameters of the system by running regressions. While their main concern is to establish that under certain conditions agents discover the one or more rational expectations equilibria defined by various standard Classical dynamic general equilibrium models, Evans and Honkapohja make it clear that these conditions are not guaranteed. From a Keynesian perspective, in which the equilibrium position is liable to discontinuous shifts due to changes in the state of long-term expectation or the propensity to consume, the ability of agents to form reliable and convergent estimates by the econometric analysis of past data is, at the very least, open to question.
The important distinction must be made between convergence from a position of simple disequilibrium per se and convergence from a position of short-period equilibrium to a position of long-period equilibrium. Both Kregel and the Walrasians are concerned with the former, extremely difficult, case. The latter is the Marshallian case which is analytically far more tractable and for which stability is much more assured (Hayes, 2006, pp. 99-100; 2007, pp. 75-77 Kregel's shifting disequilibrium, in which we chase shadows through the twilight.
Doing without the tacit assumption
The task of this paper is mainly critical but would not be complete without an indication as to how it is possible to understand Keynes without making the tacit assumption. The essential insight is a recognition that the analytical core of The General Theory, as summarised in GT Chapter 18, is a static equilibrium model which links a set of independent variables and parameters with a set of dependent variables in a determinate fashion at a single point in time. 'Static' here means instantaneous, not unchanging; paradoxically, only a static equilibrium model can cope with discontinuous change. The object of The General Theory is 'to discover what determines at any time the national income of a given economic system and (which is almost the same thing) the amount of its employment' (GT, p. 247, emphasis added).
The ultimate independent variables are the three psychological factors (the propensity to consume and the states of liquidity preference and of long-term expectation), the quantity of money and the wage-unit (GT, pp. 246-247). The parameters, the 'elements in the economic system we usually take as given' (GT, p. 245) are those of the Marshallian system, i.e. endowment, technology and preferences, together with the degree of competition. The dependent variables, income and employment, have a functional relation (GT, p. 246) with the set of expected prices at industry level which constitute the singular state of short-term expectation. It is these expectations that proximately determine output and employment, as the title of GT Chapter 5 indicates (GT, p. 46).
The principal difficulty is to understand how these expected prices can be determined by the equilibrium of supply and demand at any time. As Keynes takes pains to emphasise in GT Chapter 4, output is not homogeneous, so that the expected prices, on which today's employment depends, relate to a variety of goods all with different production periods, at different stages of completion, and with a multitude of different dates for final delivery. Thus the expected prices are prices for delivery at different future dates, yet all must be determined today if they are to be more than individual subjective expectations and form a singular state of short-term expectation.
As already noted, Keynes specifies aggregate demand in terms of the expectations of entrepreneurs. Fundamental to the notion of competitive equilibrium is the independence of supply and demand, and in Keynes's exposition on p. 25 of
The General Theory it is not obvious how entrepreneurs can face a demand curve which represents their own expectation of proceeds. We are driven to separate Keynes's entrepreneurs into two groups, employers of labour and dealers in goods, corresponding to the traditional division of industry and commerce between manufacturers and merchants. There is some textual warrant for doing so, in Keynes's reference to the medium-term expectations of distributors (GT, p. 47), but he does not elaborate. Some further light on this whole topic is shed by Keynes's correspondence with Hawtrey over the final draft of The General Theory (CW XIII, pp. 596-632).
Hawtrey questioned the need to introduce expectations at all:
You may say that all this is to be assumed to refer to expectations. But are employers to be supposed to make all these calculations in terms of real income, current investment and the propensity to consume? Each employer's (hypothetical) expectation is presumably confined to his own product, and I
do not see how you are going to aggregate these particular expectations into a total of consumption and a total of investment, nor is there any reason why these totals, if they can be formed, should be consistent with one another … I note that in chapter 5, where you examine the expectations by which employment is determined, you do not use the expression 'effective demand' at all. The passage on page 51, with the appended footnote, does something to link up 'effective demand' (in your sense) with actual sales. But I do not think it gives an accurate picture of the process by which productive activity is determined, because it does not distinguish between the retailers, whose business it is to watch sales and replenish their stocks, the manufacturers, who for the most part produce in response to firm forward orders, and the primary producers, whose output is to a great extent imposed upon them by natural conditions. In chapter 8 the underlying idea seems to be that effective demand simply reflects actual demand. It seems to me that what you want to express is that if employers make a miscalculation and actual sales either outstrip or fall behind production, the result will be increased or diminished employment. (CW XIII, Keynes replied:
The main point … seems to me to affect the whole supply and demand theory
and not my version of it in particular. I have the impression that you restrict the supply and demand method to market prices only, that is to say, they relate to the higgling of the market in respect of stocks which already exist. Hawtrey rejoined:
Of course it is true that 'the demand which determines the decision as to how much plant to employ must necessarily concern itself with expectations'. My objection from the beginning has been to the expression of the expectations in the form of a numerical aggregate … The expectations of demand are to be found, strictly speaking, only in the minds of those, such as the retailers, who sell to the final purchasers. But it is not the retailers who give employment.
That devolves on manufacturers and other producers whose expectations are concerned primarily with the orders they receive from the retailers … I do not dispute that there are some instances where a definite relation can be traced between an expectation as to demand and the volume of employment given.
But even then it may be very difficult to say which of a number of different Hawtrey rejoined, prophetically:
You say you find the introduction of a numerical expression for expected demand 'an aid to thought'. But I fear that to any reader who wants to visualise your theory in relation to the facts the introduction of such an awkward fiction will be a stumbling block. The difficulties I have described to you will prevent clear thinking. Keynes's final position was:
The process here is exactly the same as that by which a market price is fixed for a share of which no one really knows the prospective yield accurately. I was really conceding too much in saying it was a fiction. The market is regularly engaged in assessing in terms of an exact numeral a complex of rather vague probabilities. (ibid., p. 632) This correspondence shows that Keynes refused to relinquish effective demand in favour of Hawtrey's suggestion, which became received wisdom, that employment equilibrium should be defined by the fulfilment of expectations in the Swedish style.
Keynes must have seen that to abandon his particular treatment of expectation, in which effective demand replaces Marshall's short-period Normal prices determined by supply and demand, was to lose the determinacy of his theory of value. He insists that effective demand is an objective numerical quantity determined by market forces.
He does not question Hawtrey's division of industry and commerce, which is part of their common Marshallian heritage, but seems to regard it as belonging to a lower level of abstraction (c.f. Marshall, 1920, p. 283) . Nevertheless, Hawtrey was right to fear that it would prove difficult to visualise what Keynes meant by effective demand and his division between employers and dealers suggests a way forward.
Most production takes time so that an employer needs to make a production decision today, based on expectations of the price of finished goods at the time of delivery. Employers specialise in managing the risks of production and dealers the risks of marketing finished goods. Although a large firm may combine both functions, they remain distinct in principle. It is therefore reasonable to assume that production M G Hayes takes place only when an employer receives an order, usually from a dealer or another
employer. An order is a forward contract which fixes the price payable for the goods when they have been finished and delivered. The dealer's business includes accepting the risk that the spot price for the finished goods may have changed by the time they are delivered. Non-transferable and sometimes unwritten forward contracts are the standard method of business, used far beyond the limits of organised futures exchanges.
Each type of good has a different production period and delivery date for an order placed today, depending on the technical conditions of its production.
Competition between the employers in an industry will establish a common supply price for delivery of any given quantity of finished goods at different dates in the future. An industry supply curve could be drawn, relating a range of different supply prices and quantities for delivery in (say) three months.
Dealers hold stocks of finished goods in warehouses or on shelves, together with undelivered goods currently on order and in production under contract. The price they are prepared to bid for forward deliveries of new production will depend on their expectations of the final demand over the course of the relevant production period and beyond. They attempt to forecast how the future expenditure of consumers and investors (including other firms) will affect stock levels. Their bids will partly depend on whether stocks are too high or low, relative to the most efficient level for operating purposes, and also on their speculative expectations of price movements. Competition between the dealers in an industry will establish a common demand price for delivery of any given quantity of finished goods at different dates in the future. An industry demand curve could be drawn, relating a range of different demand prices and quantities for delivery in (say) three months.
Aggregate demand depends on the expectations of dealers, not directly on the expenditure of investors and consumers. 6 Except in the few cases where forward orders are placed by the final customer and of some services, it could not be otherwise, since current expenditure can be made only on goods that are already finished. Furthermore, while the prices fetched by finished goods sold today are often a reasonable guide to the prices that can be expected upon delivery for goods of which production is just about to begin, this is not necessarily so. That is precisely the judgement that has to be made by the dealers.
Given the expectations of dealers, the above construction establishes a forward market price for each good on which production is to begin today and these prices, I
suggest, are the elements of the state of short-term expectation. To each set of expected prices there corresponds a determinate, equilibrium level of employment at any time. Expectation may shift from day to day, yet each day employment and output are in equilibrium. The full development of this approach to understanding the principle of effective demand can be found elsewhere (Hayes, 2006 (Hayes, , 2007 .
At no point does this definition of equilibrium require the fulfilment of expectations. Disappointment of short-term expectations may, or may not, change the state of expectation but these disappointments are likely to be trivial compared to the effect of sudden shifts in the states of long-term expectation or of liquidity preference.
The formation of expectations is always a matter for the present moment and it is not necessary to tangle with insoluble problems of expectations formation under dynamic conditions of unpredictable discontinuity.
Conclusion
The claim, that Keynes's exposition of the principle of effective demand in Chapter 3
of The General Theory involves a tacit assumption that short-term expectations are fulfilled, is unwarranted and unnecessary, owing more to Stockholm than to Keynes.
The interpretative framework that requires the assumption has undermined Keynes's claim to offer a determinate theory of employment at any time and helped to lead post-Keynesian economists away from competitive equilibrium theory altogether.
This in turn has left the Classical theory of competitive equilibrium unchallenged on its own terms and in substance, despite the increase in technical sophistication, in the same state that it was before Keynes wrote.
To read The General Theory as a theory of employment as in equilibrium at any time does not preclude us from using tools other than equilibrium theory to investigate how the economy behaves over time. On the contrary, competitive equilibrium analysis must be confined to its legitimate domain, the present moment or at most, the short term. Keynes's short-term expectations are, by his own words, what
we would now call short-term rational expectations. Keynes refers to a 'rational attempt to foresee' (see above) and in his 1937 lecture notes against the Swedish method, to 'judicious foresight'. The correspondence with Hawtrey suggests that this is the meaning of Keynes's statement in those notes that 'The main point is to is to distinguish the forces determining the position of equilibrium from the technique of trial and error by means of which the entrepreneur discovers where the position is'
(CW XIV, p. 182).
It seems that, according to Keynes, entrepreneurs do not commit systematic errors, at least in the short term … yet unlike the stationary New Classical world, the position of equilibrium can shift abruptly with a change in the state of long-term expectation. The method of rational expectations equilibrium analysis cannot legitimately be applied to the long term. Today's short-term expectations and employment may be equilibrium values, but they can shift discontinuously between today and tomorrow and no mathematics based on continuous functions can bridge the abyss. We need different tools to explain phenomena which involve progress through time, such as economic growth, fluctuations and crises. Keynes's distinction between the theory of stationary equilibrium and the theory of shifting equilibrium remains the essential starting point.
